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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL 
1. Plaintiff/Appellant Coulter & Smith, Ltd. (hereafter "Coulter & Smith") 
2. Defendants/Appellees Roger Russell and Kristen Russell (hereafter 
sometimes collectively "Russell"). 
3. No other named defendants are a party to this appeal. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
CASE LAW iv, v 
STATUTES v 
OTHER v 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVEEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE CITATIONS 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 3 
2. STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 7 
ISSUE NO. 1 7 
ISSUE NO. 2 8 
ISSUE NO. 3 9 
ISSUE NO. 4 9 
ARGUMENT 10 
I. THE SUBJECT TRANSACTION WAS NOT WITHIN THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS 10 
A. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY 
BECAUSE THE PARTIES AGREED UPON WHICH 
PROPERTY WAS TO BE TRANSFERRED, AND THE 
AGREEMENT PROVIDED A DEFINITE MEANS BY 
WHICH THE REMAINING DETAILS WOULD BE 
FIXED 10 
B. COULTER & SMITH HAS PARTIALLY PERFORMED 
UNDER THE AGREEMENT, THEREBY TAKING THIS 
TRANSACTION OUTSIDE OF THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS 17 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS CONT'D 
PAGE 
C. DUE TO HIS ACTIONS, RUSSELL SHOULD BE 
EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING THE 
VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT 19 
II. THE TRAIL COURT IMPROPERLY RULED THAT A REASONABLE 
TIME PERIOD HAD PASSED FOR EXERCISE OF THE OPTION . 20 
HI. THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES 21 
A. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES DOES NOT 
APPLY TO CONTRACTS D7 PERFORMANCE IS TO 
TAKE PLACE WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME FRAME 
WITHIN THE PERPETUITIES PERIOD 22 
B. THE AGREEMENT COULD NOT VIOLATE THE RULE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES GIVEN THE TRIAL COURT'S 
RULING ON THE "REASONABLE" TIME ISSUE 25 
IV. THE AGREEMENT WAS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE 
CONSIDERATION 26 
CONCLUSION 29 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 30 
APPENDICES 
I. Copy of Agreement between Parties 
n. Trial Court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
III. Trial Court's Judgment 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE LAW 
CITE PAGE 
Anderson v. Anderson. 386 P.2d 406 (Utah 1963) 22 
Bellevue College v. Greater Omaha Realty Co.. 348 N.W.2d 
837 (Neb. 1984) 15 
Bill Brown Realty. Inc. v. Abbott. 562 P.2d 
238 (Utah 1977) 2 
Bradford v. Alvev & Sons. 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980) 24, 25 
Calder v. Third Judicial District Court. 273 P.2d 
157 (Utah 1954) 14, 15 
Continental Bank and Trust v. Stewart. 4 Utah 2d 228, 
291 P.2d 890 (1955) 11 
Cooper v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. 757 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1988) 24 
Culp v. Tri-Countv Tractor. Inc.. 736 P.2d 
1348 (Idaho App. 1987) 25 
Davison v. Robbins. 517 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1973) 15 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman. 740 P.2d 
275 (Utah App. 1987) 24 
Durham v. Margetts. 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977) 1 
Hackford v. Snow. 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982) 11 
Hunt v. ESI Engineering. Inc. 808 P.2d 
1137 (Utah Ct. App.) 1, 2, 20 
Jacobson v. Cox. 202 P.2d 714 (Utah 1949) 12, 19 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONT'D 
CASE LAW 
CITE PAGE 
LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson. 486 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1971) 18 
Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc.. 815 P.2d 
1356 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 11 
Park West Village. Inc. v. Avise. 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986) 12 
Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) 11 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co.. Inc.. 706 P.2d 
1028 (Utah 1985) 28 
Rodin v. Merritt. 48 N.C.App. 64; 268 S.E.2d 539 (1980) 22, 23, 24 
Stauffer v. Call. 589 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1979) 12 
Themv v. Seagull Enterprises. Inc.. 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979) 1, 2, 20 
Vasels v. LoGuidice. 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987) 15 
Wineear v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) 1, 2 
Wong v. DiGrazia. 35 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1963) 22, 23, 24 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-8 17 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k) 1 
OTHER 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3 
3 Simes & Smith, Future Interests (2d ed. 1956) § 1228 at p. 122 23 
77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser §35 (1975) 28 
v 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the Statute of Frauds 
precluded enforcement of the parties' Agreement. The trial court's legal conclusion was 
predicated primarily on improper factual findings that were made only by ignoring evidence that 
Coulter & Smith presented to the trial court. Because disposition of a case on summary 
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, this court must review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Coulter & Smith, and reverse because there were genuine disputes as to 
material issues of fact that preclude Russell from obtaining summary judgment as a matter of 
law. U.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Themv v. Seagull Enterprises. Inc.. 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979); Hunt 
v. ESI Engineering. Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1991). Moreover, since summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, this 
court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions to the facts as viewed in the light 
most favorable to Coulter & Smith. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Coulter & Smith in its opposition to Russell's 
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment at R. 230-236. 
2. The trial court improperly found, despite conflicting affidavits that the parties had 
submitted, that a "reasonable" time for exercise of the option had passed. On review of a grant 
of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard as that applied 
by the trial court. Durham v. Margetts. 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). The presence of factual 
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disputes precludes summary judgment. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott. 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 
1977). This issue was preserved in the trial court by Coulter & Smith in its opposition to 
Russell's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alt. for Summary Judgment at R. 239, 256, and in its 
Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, R. 362. 
3. The trial court erroneously ruled as a matter of law that the parties' Agreement 
violated the rule against perpetuities. This is a conclusion of law which this court must review 
for correctness without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Winegar, 
supra, Froerer, supra. This issue was preserved in the trial court by Coulter & Smith in its 
opposition to Russell's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alt. for Summary Judgment at R. 238-40. 
4. The trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the Agreement was not 
supported by any consideration. The trial court's legal conclusion was predicated primarily on 
an improper factual finding that Russell received no benefit as a result of Coulter & Smith's 
promises and efforts made in reliance on the Agreement. This court must review the evidence 
in the light most favorable to Coulter & Smith, and reverse because there were genuine disputes 
as to material issues of fact that preclude Russell from obtaining summary judgment as a matter 
of law. U.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Themv v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., supra. Hunt v. ESI Engineering, 
Inc., supra. Additionally, this court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusion that 
the Agreement lacked consideration. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., supra. This issue was preserved 
in the trial court by Coulter & Smith in its opposition to Russell's Motion to Dismiss or in the 
Alternative for Summary Judgment at R. 240-41, and in its Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment at R. 362-63. 
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DETERMINATIVE CITATIONS 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows: 
The judgment sought [pursuant to Rule 56] shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE. Coulter & Smith seeks enforcement of written 
agreement to purchase certain real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Coulter 
& Smith was to develop and subdivide the real property and to pay Russell for the individual 
lots after the subdivision development and upon the sale of each lot. Based upon the Agreement, 
Coulter & Smith invested substantial funds and efforts to develop the real property. 
Later on, despite the Agreement and Coulter & Smith's substantial investment, 
Russell refused to honor the Agreement, and the suit below was filed to compel its enforcement. 
At the same time as they filed their answer to the complaint (R. 123-129) and 
before any discovery had been commenced or conducted, Russell filed a "Motion to Dismiss or, 
In the Alternative, For Summary Judgment" (R. 104-122). After a hearing, the trial court 
granted Russell's motion, not as one to dismiss, but as a summary judgment. The trial court 
then entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 453-457), and a Judgment in favor 
of Russell,1 declaring that Coulter & Smith had no claim or interest in the real property that is 
1
 Defendant/Appellee Kristen Russell was joined in the suit after the hearing on the Motion 
to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, at the same time as entry of the final 
judgment (R. 000386, 000462). 
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the subject of the action and dismissing Coulter & Smith's claims, with prejudice (R. 461-463). 
The trial court's judgment was entered as of May 16, 1995 (R. 463). Coulter & Smith filed its 
Notice of Appeal on June 8, 1995 (R. 464-465). 
2. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Coulter & Smith and Roger Russell entered into an agreement in the spring of 1991 
whereby Coulter & Smith was to develop in concert with other real property it owned in the 
immediate area, a 3.67-acre parcel of property owned (or controlled) by Russell (the "3.67- Acre 
Parcel") (R. 217, 12; R. 218, 16; R. 341-343). After the 3.67 Acre Parcel had been developed 
and subdivided, Coulter & Smith was to pay for the individual lots to be located within the 
subdivided 3.67-Acre Parcel (R. 217,15; R. 343,19). The agreement allowed Russell to obtain 
a greater purchase price for the 3.67-Acre Parcel because the parcel was worth considerably 
more developed, with dense zoning, allowing the maximum number of lots to be established on 
the 3.67-Acre Parcel (R. 344, 110). Thus, the parties agreed that the purchase price of the 
3.67-Acre Parcel would be determined and paid after the subdivision development and upon the 
sale of each subdivided lot. (R. 217, 15; R. 343, 19). The parties' agreement was 
memorialized on or about April 27, 1991 in a letter agreement signed by both parties (the 
"Agreement") (R. 217, 13). (Exhibit "A" hereto). 
The Agreement was the result of negotiations between Coulter & Smith and Russell to 
develop the 3.67-Acre Parcel in conjunction with other real property that Coulter & Smith 
owned in the area (R. 342-343). Russell had previously engaged engineers to design a layout 
for the 3.67-Acre Parcel as a "stand-alone" development. Russell faced major obstacles in 
developing the 3.67-Acre Parcel in this fashion, for the property had no storm drain outlet and 
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vrwi^ifvi! rr-ii-mg for the sanitary sewer system. In addition, it was questionable whether Sandy 
City would allow a single access to any "stand-alone" subdivision on tiu. • 6, - A u i » a i u i ' 
t ,.,,;., / ' ' -ji & Smith agreed that 
Coulter & Smith would woik to develop a l ama subdivision in H.-I ,, he 3.67-Acre Parcel 
would be a pai ';-:*!•• i- the nverall [ 1:111 >1 
development (which included the ^ 67 Arrr PareH> would require Coulter & Smith ro acquire 
at least four additional parcels south o t m t . - - ... .^ . . . . . -
prim in ilif Aut 'cannn ,ind Thereafter, Coulter & Smith and Russell discussed the difficulties of 
acquiring these additional parcels, and at all times relevant hereto, Russell was aware wi c wUner 
jsc \ : : i r ^' : i l l ' - V " ' 1 - • ' , r " ' ' *' * > R- 340, 
114). . . , . • 
I n c o n j u n c t i o n . . . ; . . . . . . ' i >•* * 
subdivision and storm drain $ystems bo as »o ;nv<wimodate i;ic development of the 3 . 6 7 - A , T C 
Parcel, and, went to work negotiating wim 5U,M,, V :,_> m re-route access to the proposed 
dcvHnpmcnl <\\u\ I'm fir nni rssarv storm drain routing and approvals, again, for the benefit: of 
the 3.67-Acre Parcel (R. 218-219, 19: R. 345, f 12). Coulter & Smith solicited neighborhood 
suppoii inn mis ;ILLIJ,"A ft" uiijir plan, wlm-h niimviipiv u'nn *s-inJv fjfy ;ip|iii" n/jii ysnd demonstrated 
the feasibility of two access points to the - <>7-Ane Pai..*-; solving one m uu- development 
problems that KUSV„. Hit also ilei M " : " sunit.irv 
s e w e r from | t s o r ig i I l a i plans to allow for hookups from future lots on i,he 3.0?-Acre Parcel •: k 
345, 112). The extra cost of this work, which Coulter & Smith worn .4. .. . u -.. -M..!!, 
ff»r 'V ' rmnui l w;is if excess of $15,000.00 (R. 345, 112). In addition, Coulter & Smith had 
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its engineers redesign the storm drainage system to enlarge the line and install portions of it 
deeper in order to accommodate development of the 3.67-Acre Parcel. The extra cost of this 
redesigned system was approximately $20,000.00 (R. 345, f 12). Coulter & Smith undertook 
these activities and expended this additional $35,000.00 as a direct result of the Agreement (R. 
345, 112). 
In addition to its activities described above, Coulter & Smith went to work on acquiring 
the additional four parcels. The difficulties in the negotiations were continually reported to 
Russell, and when the additional four parcels were not acquired by the Spring of 1992, Coulter 
& Smith consulted with Russell regularly on a weekly or biweekly basis. During all of this 
time, Russell encouraged Coulter & Smith to continue its efforts and understood and acquiesced 
in the time needed to accomplish this difficult task. (R. 218, 18; R. 219, 1112, 13, 14; R. 346, 
114). 
In late October or early November 1992, Coulter & Smith had signed contracts with two 
of the four owners of the additional parcels, and had negotiated agreements with the other two 
owners. (R. 219-220,114; R. 346, 115) At that point, while making one of his regular progress 
reports to Russell, Coulter & Smith was told by Russell that he (Russell) had been by contacted 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints ("LDS Church") and that he (Russell) intended 
to sell the property to the LDS Church. (R. 219-220, 114; R. 346, 114). 
Coulter & Smith considered Russell's intent to sell the property to the LDS Church to 
be a breach of the Agreement. But in order to resolve their differences, Coulter & Smith agreed 
to attempt to negotiate a three-way settlement. In fact, Russell, recognizing Coulter & Smith's 
contractual interest in the 3.67-Acre Parcel, had his attorney draft the three-way settlement 
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documents (R J" II), "11 " l" "I if iwleh however, the I ,DS Church realized that there were certain 
difficulties in building on the 3.67-Acre Parcel, and it ultimately withdrew its offer for the 3.67-
Acre Parcel and relocated its building plans lu >lhei propoil
 t' ('nulla A" Smith owmn 
. - area (R. 220, f 16). 
Thereafter, despite Coulter & Smith's continued enor ts, Russell ickiscJ Ju iditi n ( oulirr 
X Siinih1^ fdeplioii" r.i'l'i n,|i IIMI'ISCUSS development any further, totally failing to cooperate with 
Coulter & Smith and completely frustrating Coulter & Smith's ability to proceed with the 
development. • - "• . * "• *• ich of the Agreement, asked 
Coulter & Smith rr relinquish its interest in the ^ fr ' Wre ivjcei bv Quit Claim Deed so that 
he (Russell) could sell ..i<~ . iv/pcn; 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE NO. 1. 
The Statute of Frauds does not prevent enforcement 
The trial court erred in ruling that the Statute of Frauds applied w prevent enforcement 
of this Agreement There was no dispute between the parties as u :i;i : _ . , -\K 
Agreement referenced, ;m<l Ihe lu;il eourl even made a factual finding 'that 'the Agreement 
referenced the 3.67-Acre Parcel. The Statute of Frauds does not require a legal description be 
included in the writing that memoi iali zes the sale of **1 ' "* ** * nrnvided that 'the identity of 
the land subject to the sale is reasonably certain, The M-.- \r> L tan is clear that even if the 
language identifying the propert) i" MIOH w'lul »iiiibigiiou,l mini', una) lonsidn cxtnnsk 
evidence outside of the contract to determine the intent of the parties and the enforeeabilii} o 
the contract. Because there was no dispute between the p^nes a . 
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Agreement to cover, the extrinsic evidence was sufficiently definite to show that there was a 
mutual agreement between the parties which may be specifically enforced by the Court. 
The trial court also erred in not ruling that Coulter & Smith's partial performance also 
takes the Agreement outside of the Statute of Frauds. The statute itself indicates that the powers 
of courts to compel specific performance of agreements in case of partial performance is not 
abrogated by the Statute of Frauds. Coulter & Smith took substantial steps toward developing 
the 3.67-Acre Parcel in accordance with the Agreement. The benefits to Russell as a result of 
Coulter & Smith's efforts are significant. This part performance is sufficient to remove the 
Agreement from the Statute of Frauds. 
The trial court also erred in not finding that Russell should be equitably estopped from 
attacking the validity of the Agreement under the Statute of Frauds. Under Utah law, the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents the Statute of Frauds from being used by a party to defeat 
a just and equitable cause against him, where the party has accepted the benefits of an 
agreement. In reliance upon the Agreement, Coulter & Smith undertook steps to improve and 
develop the 3.67-Acre Parcel as a part of the entire subdivision, steps he would not have taken 
unless Russell had signed the Agreement. Russell has accepted these benefits and therefore 
should be equitably estopped from asserting any alleged ambiguity in the property description 
as a defense to Coulter & Smith's proper claim for specific enforcement. 
ISSUE NO. 2. 
The Trial Court Improperly Ruled that 
A Reasonable Time for Exercise of the Option had Passed, 
Summary judgment may not be granted when there are genuine disputes over material 
issues of fact. The trial court improperly ruled over conflicting affidavits presented by both 
8 
parties (h.if as ol the January 1995 hearing date, a reasonable time for exercise of the option had 
passed. The trial court's ruling ignored, the conflicts in the evidence and also ignored factors 
luivniid i.'oullu Ai .Siimli'1 • "ul winch would iiilluniix vviiuf constitutes a "reasonable" time 
•frame. The trial court's ru -n^ on this issue should be reversed. 
ISSUE NO. 3. 
I he Rule Against Perpetuities does not operate 
to prevent enforcement of this Agreement. 
The trial court also m ^ iiu\ ilk, Agreement may not *_ ^pecnieally enforced because 
i! vmlaies (lie Mile against perpetuities. However, 'the rule against perpetuities has been sharply 
curtailed in modern times when s^jclit to ^e applied to c ommercui ! transactions When a 
c( * • .j. •• • • i ^  • . • • .-K - iat performance must be 
within a reasonable u:nc .•» die lime within which thai performance is to take place is within 
agreement. 
Tn this case, the fact that the trial court did make a tactual finding as i il 
re JM>I- *H. :'. >s<si:- »d.* , - wlv- S^ic rule against perpetuities has not been violated. Despite 
conflicting evidence, the in.u ^ouri (improperly) found, that four years was the time period within 
•< .r» * ^ * il within the perpetuities 
period, the Agreement COL A not. as A :uatt< . r\ i ^ ;oUu the rule against perpetuities. 
ISSUE 4. 
'I'he Agreement was Supported by Ample Consideration. 
The trial court erroneously concluded, despite disputed evidence, that the Agreement was 
Smith's promises to assist Russell in resolving the difficulties he had, faced, in, developing the 
9 
3.67-Acre Parcel. Coulter & Smith went to substantial effort to incorporate the 3.67-Acre 
Parcel into its own development, a task that it need not have undertook absent the Agreement. 
The trial court's resolution of this factual dispute on summary judgment should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SUBJECT TRANSACTION WAS NOT WITHIN THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS, 
A. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE 
PARTIES AGREED UPON WHICH PROPERTY WAS TO BE 
TRANSFERRED, AND THE AGREEMENT PROVIDED A DEFINITE 
MEANS BY WHICH THE REMAINING DETAILS WOULD BE FIXED. 
The trial court erroneously ruled as a matter of law in this case that the Agreement 
between the parties was unenforceable because the number of lots and the price to be paid was 
"deficient": 
1. Although the legal description of the overall parcel owned by Russell 
is sufficient, the purported option is deficient as to the number of lots and as to 
the price to be paid, and therefore, the purported option is unenforceable. 
(Conclusion of Law No. 1, R. 455). This legal conclusion was predicated upon the following 
(improper) factual finding that the trial court made by ignoring the language of the Agreement 
and Coulter & Smith's further evidence that fixed these details: 
4. The purported option does not specify how many lots are to be 
developed on the Property so that the ultimate size and number of the lots to be 
sold (or controlled) is uncertain, as is the price to be paid for the entire parcel. 
(Finding of Fact No. 4, R. 454). The trial court's rulings are contrary to the law that 
interprets the Statute of Frauds2 and to the evidence presented to the trial court. 
2
 The trial court's conclusion of law did not specifically indicate that the Statute of Frauds 
was the basis on which it found the Agreement unenforceable. However, the Statute of Frauds 
(continued...) 
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,.- .. .^ - .-• • ••' ,!• ,. -v. v-< *' nd purchase real 
estate, the Statute of FnuicK does nor appiv so Ions as the idc;i;tv ot the land subject to the sale 
is reasonably certain. l i i u . ; , ,;, , ,.ii, .:. CIUJ< Uiaicu.. . t: •.'j.'iuut u-. wt, - ... ,-.•! T V . . 
mewhat ambiguous, courts may consider extrinsic e^ ^eiice outside of the contract u 
determine the intent of the parties and the enforceabiln* *•! mc contract Reed, v. Alve>. 
i ' M v i i y/A 1 1 i u i i i < - s o ) . . • . • - • • =•• •:'. •  • ^ • • . • • 
In Continental Bank and Trust v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 
(1955) we explained: ". . . where, because of vagueness or [ambiguity] in the 
language used, the intent of the parties is in question, the court may consider the 
situation of the parties, the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the 
contract, the purpose of its execution, and. respective claims thereunder, to 
ascertain why the parties intended." 291 P.2d at 891-92. 
KCCU v . /V ive ). 
For example in the following cases, the Utah Supreme Court, relying on extrinsic 
evidence concerning the parties knowledge J» I" ulul l.'ii'i \\AS in "h'cd ordnvd specific 
performance of contracts containing the following identifications of land: 
*• "[CJorner of Hillview and Ninth East.' ^ccu \ . Aive>. ; 
1 , " ? I -. )la, (420 acre Hackford Farm), Uintah County, State of Uu ; J i." 
Hackford v. Snow, iVt ' I11 "'ill III} II, III,"" i I I, II11 nil VW?.)\ • 
-(...continued; 
was the only argument that Russell made to the trial court that was predicated on an alleged 
deficiency in the number of lots and the price to be paid. Coulter & Smith does not anticipate 
that Russell will raise anything other than the Statute of Frauds on appeal to support the trial 
court's (erroneous) legal conclusion. However, not having argued any other issue below, 
Russell would be precluded from arguing on this appeal anything other than the Statute of 
Frauds. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (UtahCt. App. 1991) (appellate courts 
will not consider arguments that were not raised before the trial conn* 
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c. n[U]p in the old field, now under fence above Spring Branch 
Ditch." Jacobson v. Cox. 202 P.2d 714, 721 (Utah 1949); 
d. "[RJesidence 106 Pacific, oka 106 Lumbar Yard." Park West 
Village. Inc. v. Avise. 714 P.2d 1137, 1141 (Utah 1986). 
See also. Stauffer v. Call. 589 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1979) (legal description may be based on the 
contract description and other extrinsic or parol evidence). Thus, when reviewing a contract for 
the sale of land to determine its enforceability under the Statute of Frauds, the trial court should 
look first to the language of the contract, and then to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' 
intent. 
In applying this principle to the case at bar, the trial court, correctly, looked first to the 
Agreement between the parties. On Coulter & Smith letterhead, the Agreement reads as 
follows: 
Dear Dr. Russell: 
In response to your request for a written proposal to purchase your lots 
west of 1700 East at 10800 South, I submit the following offer which you may 
accept by signing below: 
Price: $26,500 per lot during the 1st month following completion of the 
lots; price of each lot to increase $100 per lot each month thereafter until each 
lot is closed. 
Upon completion of the subdivision development we offer to pay you 
$1,500 per lot; the balance of the purchase price ($25,000 at the outset) to be 
paid upon closing of each lot. We understand that the cost of the land and the 
lot improvements will be paid upon closing of each lot. 
The enclosed Work Exchange Agreement will initiate our cooperative 
efforts. We will proceed posthaste to annex and develop our tracts jointly. I 
believe that working in concert will greatly facilitate zoning and all other 
development concerns. 
Respectfully, 
\s\ Nathan Coulter 
Coulter & Smith Ltd. is hereby granted an option to purchase lots as per terms 
detailed above: This option terminates 2 years from the date of completion of the 
subdivision. 
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\s\ Dr. Roger Russell 4/27/91 
(R. 217, f3; R. 222) (Appendix I hereto). The language within the Agreement which allowed 
the property to be identified is the boundary set by 1700 East at 10800 South and the recognition 
that the lots are not yet developed. The extrinsic evidence that completes the identification is 
Russell's own admission that the 3.67-Acre Parcel is the property that is the subject of the 
Agreement. Russell has acknowledged throughout this litigation, both below and on appeal, that 
the property that is the subject of the Agreement is the 3.67-Acre Parcel. (See, e.g., R. 69-70; 
R. 268; Memorandum in Support of Russell's Motion for Affirmance, p. 2 (Introduction), p. 
3 (paragraphs 3-5)). Coulter & Smith acknowledges the same. (R. 217, f2). There simply is 
no dispute between the parties as to what real property the Agreement referenced. The trial 
court reflected that lack of dispute in its Finding of Fact No 2: 
2. The purported option refers to a 3.67 acre parcel owned (or controlled) 
by Russell in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
(R. 454). The parties being in complete agreement as to what property was to be sold, the 
Agreement is sufficiently definite to constitute a mutual agreement between the parties which 
may be specifically enforced. 
But despite the parties' agreement as to the property to be sold, despite the trial court's 
Finding of Fact No. 2 that the option referenced the 3.67-Acre Parcel, and despite the trial 
court's own legal conclusion that the legal description of the overall parcel 3.67-Acre Parcel was 
sufficient, (Conclusion of Law No. 1, R. 455), the trial court incorrectly held that the 
Agreement violated the Statute of Frauds because of an uncertainty as to the ultimate size and 
number of lots to be sold and the price to be paid. This ruling ignored the evidence and relied 
on an incorrect interpretation of the Statute of Frauds. 
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In ruling that the Agreement violated the Statute of Frauds, the trial court ignored the fact 
that the parties had agreed on all material details required for transfer of the property. The 
parties had agreed that they would work together "in concert [to] facilitate zoning. . ." 
(Agreement). The parties had agreed that they would seek the maximum number of lots from 
the governmental authorities, hoping that they could develop eight to ten lots. (R. 217-18, 15, 
R. 344, f 10), The parties had agreed that the price to be paid was to be $26,500.00 for each 
of the lots that were ultimately developed. (Agreement). The parties had agreed that Coulter 
& Smith had an option to buy all, not just some of the lots.3 Implicit in the parties' agreement 
was their recognition that a governmental determination of the exact number of lots to be 
developed was necessary. But this provision of the Agreement does not violate the Statute of 
Frauds. 
The Statute of Frauds does not require that all terms of the contract be set forth in the 
written agreement. When the contract provides a definite means by which the remaining details 
can be fixed without further agreement of the parties, the Statute of Frauds will not void the 
contract. Calder v. Third Judicial District Court, 273 P.2d 157 (Utah 1954). In Calder, the 
parties had agreed that the buyer would select 200 acres from a larger tract of land. Precisely 
as in the case before this court, there was no question in Calder that the larger tract of land was 
sufficiently described. The only uncertainty remaining in the Calder contract was which parcel 
of land within the bigger tract would be transferred. The parties had left the choice up to the 
3
 The Agreement itself provides that Coulter & Smith would be purchasing "your lots," and 
refers throughout to "each lot" as being the subject of the Agreement. (R. 222; Appendix I). 
Russell's own affidavit indicates that Coulter & Smith agreed to "develop the property into 
subdivided lots and purchase those lots pursuant to [the Agreement]." (R. 70, 16). (See, also, 
R. 70, 117 and 9). 
14 
buyer's discretion. Thus, the issue in Calder was whether the Statute of Frauds had been 
violated because the property that was ultimately to be transferred was uncertain as of the date 
of the agreement, it being up to the buyer to make his choice at a later date. IdL at 169. The 
Utah Supreme Court found that the contract did not violate the Statute of Frauds, because the 
right to make the selection gave a specific means to which the parties had agreed by which the 
particular property to be conveyed could be definitely located. IcL at 170. Thus, the writing 
was a valid, enforceable contract, and the trial court's dismissal of the claim for specific 
performance was overruled. IdL at 171.4 
Furthermore, specific performance may be ordered even where a defined lot may have 
not been existence at the time the agreement was executed. Bellevue College v. Greater Omaha 
Realty Co., 348 N.W.2d 837 (Neb. 1984). In that case, the parties had agreed that 
"approximately two acres of [Greater Omaha's] property adjacent to Betz Road" would be 
conveyed to Belle vue College. The trial court's decision, affirmed on appeal, ordered Greater 
Omaha to convey a specific lot to Belle vue College, which lot had not been in existence at the 
time of the option, but had subsequently been developed by Greater Omaha: 
There is, we believe, sufficient evidence to permit the court to order specific 
performance. The location of Betz Road is known and is definite and 
ascertainable. Likewise, the amount of ground to be conveyed to Belle vue 
College is ascertainable. Furthermore, it appears from an examination of certain 
of the preliminary plats that the property ordered by the trial court to be conveyed 
by Greater Omaha to Bellevue College is exactly the land which was designated 
by Greater Omaha as a specific lot in exhibits 15 and 15, first as Lot 40 and then 
4
 Cf. Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987) (Statute of Frauds violated 
where size, shape and description of property to be conveyed left to future agreement of parties); 
and Davison v. Robbins, 517 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1973) (Statute of Frauds violated where contract 
is expressly contingent on future negotiation as to how much of the 150 acres the sellers would 
be able to reserve). 
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as Lot 41. While the record is unclear as to whether the location of the lot to be 
conveyed was in existence at the time the letter agreement was entered into, it is 
clear that the land ordered conveyed by the trial court coincides exactly with a lot 
designed by Greater Omaha abutting Betz Road and containing approximately 2 
acres. The evidence leaves no doubt that, at least in the minds of the developers, 
what ultimately became Lot 41 was intended to be, at some point, conveyed to 
Bellevue College in satisfaction of . . . the letter agreement. 
Id, at 841. 
In the case before this court, while the lots may not yet have been developed at the time 
of execution of the Agreement, the evidence presented was that the parties intended that Coulter 
& Smith have an option on all of the lots ultimately developed within the 3.67-Acre Parcel, not 
just some of the lots, or just one of the lots, as was the case in Bellevue College. The writing 
between the parties in the instant case and the extrinsic evidence that was presented to the trial 
court make it clear that Coulter & Smith had an option to buy the entire 3.67-Acre Parcel and 
all of the lots developed within it. The only contingency in the Agreement was how many lots 
would ultimately be allowed by governmental authorities. The method provided in the 
Agreement for fixing the purchase price was to first obtain the decision of the governmental 
authorities and then multiply that number by $26,500.00. The method of determining the 
remaining contingency having been fixed at the time, the Agreement is sufficient to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is not to perpetrate a fraud. Where, as here, there 
is no dispute between the parties as to what property is to be transferred, the Statute of Frauds 
should not be used to avoid that agreement. The trial court's rulings that the Agreement is 
deficient and violative of the Statute of Frauds should be reversed. 
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B. COULTER & SMITH HAS PARTIALLY PERFORMED 
UNDER THE AGREEMENT, THEREBY TAKING THIS 
TRANSACTION OUTSIDE OF THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. 
By part performance, even without a writing, a contract can be taken outside of the 
Statute of Frauds. As recognized in the statute itself: 
Nothing in this chapter [Statute of Frauds] contained shall be construed to abridge 
the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of 
part performance. 
U.C. A. §25-5-8. The Statute of Frauds does not apply to the facts at hand, because Coulter & 
Smith's work in developing the 3.67-Acre Parcel constitute sufficient part performance to take 
the Agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. 
The trial court rejected this argument below, erroneously finding that work that Coulter 
& Smith performed in reliance on the Agreement was not a detriment to Coulter & Smith. The 
trial court's findings of fact on this issue are as follows: 
12. Coulter & Smith did work to establish a subdivision, but it was not 
work done strictly to enhance the value of the Property, [emphasis added]. 
13. Coulter & Smith's work to establish a subdivision was not a detriment 
to Coulter & Smith because it enhanced the value of its own property. 
(R. 455). These findings, however, belie the evidence that Coulter & Smith undertook 
substantial steps toward developing the 3.67-Acre Parcel that it would not have taken in the 
absence of the Agreement, and that Russell reaped significant benefit from this work. For 
example, Coulter & Smith had its engineers redesign the entire subdivision and storm drain 
systems to accommodate incorporation of the 3.67-Acre Parcel into the subdivision (R. 218-219, 
f9; R. 345, if 12). Coulter & Smith rallied neighborhood support for its access re-route plan, 
and then conducted extensive negotiations with Sandy City to adopt the plan. IcL This plan, 
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eventually approved by Sandy City, demonstrated the feasibility of two access points to the 3.67-
Acre Parcel, and solved one of the development problems that Russell had faced prior to 
entering into the Agreement. Id. Coulter & Smith also deepened the sanitary sewer from its 
original plans to allow for hookups from future lots on the 3.67-Acre Parcel (R. 345, f 12). 
Coulter & Smith's efforts taken in reliance on the Agreement cost Coulter & Smith in excess 
of $30,000.00 (R. 345, 112). The evidence presented to the trial court was that Russell received 
a direct benefit from Coulter & Smith's activities, because Sandy City would require that Russell 
utilize the facilities that Coulter & Smith installed in any future development of the 3.67-Acre 
Parcel. (R. 345-46, 113). Contrary to the trial court's finding, there was no evidence presented 
by either party that Coulter & Smith's work enhanced the value of Coulter & Smith's own 
property. In fact, the evidence presented by Coulter & Smith was that it would not have 
performed this work absent the Agreement with Russell (R. 219, \9\ R. 345, f 12). 
Moreover, it is irrelevant whether or not Coulter & Smith also benefitted, along with 
Russell from the work that was performed.5 The Agreement required Coulter & Smith to 
resolve Russell's development difficulties and to incorporate the 3.67 Acre Parcel into the 
overall development. Coulter & Smith's actions toward that end were substantial, and were 
taken in accordance with and because of the Agreement. Those actions constitute sufficient part 
performance to take the Agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. See, LeGrand Johnson Corp. 
v. Peterson, 486 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1971) (advancement of $44,000.00 toward development of 
quarries constitutes sufficient performance to remove the contract from Statute of Frauds). The 
trial court's (unfounded) factual findings that Coulter & Smith's work to incorporate Russell's 
5
 The usual purpose for entering into a contract is the mutual benefit of both parties. 
18 
property also enhanced the value of its own property are simply irrelevant to whether Coulter 
& Smith partly performed the Agreement. 
The trial court's factual findings on this issue ignore Coulter & Smith's evidence to the 
contrary, that the work performed was, in fact, a detriment to Coulter & Smith. Furthermore, 
it is improper for the trial court to make factual findings on summary judgment. Thus, these 
findings should be reversed and the issue remanded for trial. 
Alternatively, implicit in the trial court's factual findings is that Coulter & Smith's work 
was done as part of its performance obligations under the Agreement, even if Coulter & Smith 
also benefitted from the work. Coulter & Smith's part performance takes the Agreement out 
of the Statute of Frauds. Thus, the trial court's legal conclusion that the Agreement is 
unenforceable as a violation of the Statute of Frauds, must be reversed. 
C. DUE TO HIS ACTIONS, RUSSELL SHOULD BE 
EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING THE 
VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT. 
In Jacobson v. Cox, 202 P.2d 714, 722-23 (Utah 1949), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the Statute of Frauds may not be used by a party 
to defeat a just and equitable cause against him, where the party has accepted the benefits of an 
agreement. 
As explained above, the evidence of record was that as a result of the Agreement, Russell 
obtained significant benefits. The parties had a deal, and in reliance on that deal, Coulter & 
Smith undertook substantial steps to improve and develop the 3.67-Acre Parcel as a part of the 
entire subdivision. Coulter & Smith presented evidence that Russell would benefit from Coulter 
& Smith's work that was performed in reliance on the Agreement. Any future development by 
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Russell of the 3.67-Acre Parcel will be allowed, indeed, required, to utilize the improvements 
that Coulter & Smith installed at its own considerable expense. Thus, Russell benefitted from 
Coulter & Smith's efforts, regardless of the outcome of this lawsuit. (R. 345-46, 113) 
Based upon the benefits that Russell received, the trial court's ruling that the Agreement 
is unenforceable as a violation of the Statute of Frauds should be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RULED THAT A REASONABLE 
TIME PERIOD HAD PASSED FOR EXERCISE OF THE OPTION. 
Despite conflicting affidavits that the parties had submitted on the issue of when the 
Agreement was to be consummated and the property transferred, the trial court improperly ruled 
that as of the January 1995 hearing date, a reasonable time for exercise of the option had passed 
(R. 455, Finding of Fact No. 10; R. 456, Conclusion of Law No. 4). These factual findings 
were improperly made on summary judgment and should be vacated by this court, as should all 
legal conclusions based on these improper factual findings.6 Themv v. Seagull Enterprises, 
Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979); Hunt v. ESI Engineering. Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (UtahCt. App.), 
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
The evidence as to when the parties contemplated transfer of the property to Coulter & 
Smith was disputed. Russell submitted an affidavit indicating that the option was to have been 
6
 The trial court's legal conclusions based on these improper factual findings are (a) that 
the rule against perpetuities has been violated (R. 456; First Conclusion of Law No. 4); that any 
offer to sell was withdrawn (R. 456; Second Conclusion of Law No. 4); and that the option had 
lapsed because a reasonable time had passed without the purchase taking place (R. 456; 
Conclusions of Law Nos. 6 and 7). For the most part, these conclusions of law fail without 
further legal analysis simply because they are predicated on the improper factual finding as to 
what constituted a reasonable time within which the option could be exercised. The trial court's 
ruling on the rule against perpetuities, however, requires further analysis, which is set forth 
below. 
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exercised by the Spring of 1992 (R. 70, f 6). Coulter & Smith's evidence was that the parties 
intended the subdivision development to be accomplished with all due diligence, and hopefully 
the option could be exercised by the Spring of 1992 (R. 219, f 12; R. 346, 114). Coulter & 
Smith's evidence also indicated that with Russell's acquiescence and encouragement, Coulter & 
Smith continued its development efforts after the Spring of 1992 and that Coulter & Smith was 
ready to file formal application for annexation with Sandy City in December 1992. (R. 219-20, 
ft 12, 13, and 18; R. 346, 16). The trial court ignored this conflict in the evidence, and also 
ignored factors beyond Coulter & Smith's control which would influence what constitutes a 
"reasonable" time frame, including the negotiations required with the neighboring property 
owners and residents, as well as with the appropriate governmental authorities. (R. 218,118-10, 
12; R. 344, 110; R. 346, 114). The trial court also ignored the evidence presented by both 
parties that Russell flatly refused to deal with Coulter & Smith after November 1992 (R. 220, 
117; R. 71, 115). These are all facts that Coulter & Smith is entitled to prove at trial. As a 
result of ignoring these facts, the trial court improperly found that since annexation and 
development had not been completed by January 1995, a reasonable time had passed without 
exercise of the option. The trial court's ruling on this issue should be reversed, and the issue 
of what constituted a reasonable time be remanded for trial. 
ffl. THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES. 
The trial court also erroneously ruled as a matter of law that the Agreement may not be 
specifically enforced because it violates the rule against perpetuities (R. 455-56; Conclusions of 
Law Nos. 3 and 4). The Agreement does not, however, violate this rule for, based upon the 
extrinsic evidence, the parties clearly knew that the Agreement was for the forthwith 
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development of the 3.67-Acre Parcel and that consummation of the transaction was to take place 
within a reasonable time frame. As set forth above, what constituted a "reasonable" time frame 
was a question of fact that the trial court should not have resolved on summary judgment. And 
if, as Coulter & Smith's evidence indicates, the property was to be transferred within the 
perpetuities period, then the rule against perpetuities has not been violated. 
A. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES DOES NOT APPLY TO 
CONTRACTS IF PERFORMANCE IS TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN A 
REASONABLE TIME FRAME WITHIN THE PERPETUITIES PERIOD. 
The rule against perpetuities provides that: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if 
at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." Anderson 
v. Anderson, 386 P.2d 406, 407 (Utah 1963) (citations omitted). The rule "grew up as a 
limitation on family dispositions of property," Rodin v. Merritt, 48 N.C.App. 64, 68; 268 
S.E.2d 539, 542 (1980), but has been sharply curtailed in modern times when sought to be 
applied to commercial transactions: 
Rules which bear such birthmarks assume a different aspect when they are applied 
to contracts or leases in a modern society whose economic structure rests upon 
planning for the future and whose life blood is credit. Since the rule against 
perpetuities was born in a society which extolled the tight ownership of inherited 
real property, it does not facilely operate as to commercial agreements in today's 
dynamic economy. 
Id, quoting Wong v. DiGrazia. 35 Cal. Rptr. 241, 247, 386 P.2d 817, 823 (1963). 
The Rodin court was addressing a commercial transaction which was remarkably similar 
to the one before this Court. In Rodin, the plaintiffs sought specific performance of an 
agreement for the sale of land. Title was to vest only after fulfillment of certain conditions, 
including, inter alia, having the property rezoned and annexed to the city, obtaining 
governmental approvals and building permits required for the desired development, obtaining 
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satisfactory evidence of available water supply and sewage disposal, and filing all required 
subdivision plats or site plans. The contract did not set a date for transfer of title. The trial 
court had refused to enforce the contract as violative of the rule against perpetuities. The Rodin 
court, however, reversed the trial court and noted that where the time for performance is not 
specified within the contract, 
. . . the law will prescribe that performance must be within a reasonable time and 
that the contract will continue for a reasonable time, "taking into account the 
purposes the parties intended to accomplish." [citations omitted]. "In case of an 
executory contract of sale, where the time for the execution of the conveyance or 
transfer is not limited, the law implies that it is to be done within a reasonable 
time. . . . " [citations omitted] 
Rodin v. Merritt 48 N.C.App. at 71-72; 268 S.E.2d at 544. Thus, the Rodin court held that 
the subject sales agreement did not violate the rule against perpetuities. IdL 
In reaching this holding, the Rodin court relied heavily on Wong v. DiGrazia, supra. 
As the Rodin court explained, in Wong, the parties had entered into a 10-year lease that would 
commence when the building construction was completed. The lessor's obligation to construct 
was subject to a variety of conditions, including obtaining governmental approvals of plans and 
specifications. 
The agreement required the lessor to begin construction "forthwith" upon 
approval of the plans and to "continue expeditiously." The fWongl Court wrote 
a very scholarly discussion of the Rule Against Perpetuities and noted: 
Not only have the courts evolved exceptions to the rule, but the doctrine 
as to performance within a reasonable time constitutes in itself one such 
exception. Courts and scholars almost unanimously agree that provisions 
which make vesting contingent upon performance within a reasonable 
time, or some equivalent phrase, do not violate the rule "if, in the light 
of the surrounding circumstances, as a matter of construction 'a 
reasonable time' is necessarily less than twenty-one years." (3 Simes & 
Smith, Future Interests (2d ed. 1956) § 1228 at p. 122.) Many courts, in 
fact, presume that a "reasonable time" is less than the period of the rule. 
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In any event, a reasonable time in the present transaction, in the light of 
the circumstances, must necessarily be a period far less than 21 years. 
Rodin v. Merritt 48 N.C.App. at 70-71; 268 S.E.2d at 543 (quoting Wong v. DiGrazia. 35 Cal. 
Rptr. at 249-50, 386 P.2d at 825-26). Thus, in the context of modern commercial transactions, 
the rule against perpetuities does not apply if performance is to take place within a reasonable 
time, which time period itself is within the perpetuities period. 
While Utah courts have not addressed the rule against perpetuities in a similar context, 
Utah courts have held that where a contract is silent as to the time for performance, the law will 
imply that performance take place within a reasonable period of time. Cooper v. Deseret 
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 757 P.2d 483 (Utah 1988). This concept has been upheld even 
when the transfer of real property interests is at issue. For example, in Bradford v. Alvev & 
Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held that even though no time was 
specified in an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the buyers to seek and obtain financing: 
. . . when a provision in a contract requires an act to be performed without 
specifying the time, the law implies that it is to be done within a reasonable time 
under the circumstances, and in case of controversy, that is something for the 
trial court to determine. 
IcL at 1252. Similarly, in Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 280 (Utah App. 
1987), the Utah Court of Appeals construed a lease agreement that required a lessee to undertake 
certain tasks prior to the lessor's obligation to construct the buildings and then lease them to the 
lessee. In dictum, the appellate court recognized that while the agreement contained no "time 
is of the essence" provision, that the lessee "had a reasonable time under the circumstances in 
which to satisfy the conditions precedent." Id. at 280, fn. 3. 
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Therefore, while the Utah courts have not specifically addressed this issue in the context 
of the rule against perpetuities, they have acknowledged that in the context of a real estate 
transaction, a reasonable time for performance can be determined from the surrounding 
circumstances. It follows that if that reasonable time is within the perpetuities period, then the 
rule against perpetuities does not apply. 
To determine what constitutes a reasonable period of time is determined by looking at 
all of the facts and circumstances to ascertain what time was contemplated by the parties. 
Bradford v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Utah 1980). This is a question of fact to be 
resolved after hearing all the extrinsic evidence. Culp v. Tri-Countv Tractor. Inc.. 736 P.2d 
1348, 1354 (Idaho App. 1987). Here, a ruling upon the reasonableness of the time period within 
which the Agreement was to have been consummated must await a trial on the disputed facts. 
The trial court's finding that January 1995 was a reasonable time period was improper on 
summary judgment, because it ignored Coulter & Smith's evidence that Russell refused to deal 
with Coulter & Smith for most of that time period, and thereby breached the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court's ruling must therefore be reversed and the issue 
remanded for trial. Moreover, the trial court should also be instructed that if the time period 
within which these parties contemplated consummation of the Agreement was within the 
perpetuities period, then the Agreement did not violate the rule against perpetuities. 
B. THE AGREEMENT COULD NOT VIOLATE THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES GIVEN THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE 
"REASONABLE" TIME ISSUE. 
The fact that the trial court actually did make a factual finding as to the reasonableness 
of the time period between 1991 and January 1995 is a further indication that the rule against 
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perpetuities has not been violated. It was, as a matter of law, improper on summary judgment 
for the trial court to make this factual finding. But the trial court can and should, on remand 
and after trial, make a factual finding as to the time period within which the parties contemplated 
the option being exercised. The trial court's own (improper) factual finding was that four years, 
i.e., the time between when the Agreement was signed (R. 217, t1f2, 3) and January 1995, was 
a reasonable time period for the option to be exercised. The perpetuities period is lives in being 
plus 21 years. Four years is well within the perpetuities period. Thus, according to the trial 
court's own (improper) factual finding, the option could not have been exercised outside the 
perpetuities period. It follows that the option did not violate the rule against perpetuities. 
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling is internally inconsistent. 
If, after remand and on trial, the trial court were to rule that four years was the time 
period within which the option should have been exercised, then Coulter & Smith is entitled to 
prove that it could not exercise the option because Russell himself breached the Agreement and 
refused to deal with Coulter & Smith after November 1992. (R. 219-20, ft 14-17). 
Thus, the trial court's (improper) factual finding aptly demonstrates why the rule against 
perpetuities has not been violated in this case. 
IV. THE AGREEMENT WAS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE 
CONSIDERATION. 
The trial court also erroneously found, despite disputed evidence, that the Agreement was 
not supported by any consideration: 
11. Coulter & Smith paid no money and furnished no consideration for 
the purported option at the outset of the option. 
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(R. 455, Finding of Fact No. 11). Based upon this improper factual finding, the trial court 
erroneously concluded as a matter of law: 
5. The purported option is not valid in that it was not supported by 
consideration at the outset. 
While no money may have exchanged hands between Coulter & Smith and Russell, there 
was ample consideration given for the Agreement. Prior to entering into the Agreement, Coulter 
& Smith had no obligation to incorporate the 3.67-Acre Parcel into its own development or to 
attempt to resolve Russell's development problems. Coulter & Smith had already engineered 
its own development. (R. 218, f9; R. 345, f 12). As a result of the Agreement, Coulter & 
Smith became obligated to re-engineer its own development to resolve development problems 
created by the 3.67-Acre Parcel. IcL While Russell had previously hired engineers to design 
a layout for the 3.67-Acre Parcel as a stand-alone subdivision, he had encountered some major 
development obstacles, including the lack of a storm drain outlet, undefined routing for sanitary 
sewer, and problems with access. (R. 218, f7; R. 344, fl l) . Based upon the Agreement 
between Coulter & Smith and Russell, the development problems that Russell had encountered 
were resolved. Coulter & Smith's efforts to resolve these difficulties were extensive, and in part 
included a redesign of the subdivision to incorporate the 3.67-Acre Parcel, negotiation with the 
Sandy City engineer for the required routing and approvals, and deepening the sanitary sewer 
to allow for hookups to the 3.67-Acre Parcel (R. 345, f 12; 218, 1f 8, 9). Coulter & Smith 
expended more than $50,000.00 on changes made to the sanitary and storm drainage systems 
as a result of incorporating the 3.67-Acre Parcel into the overall subdivision. (R. 219, f l l ) . 
None of these expenditures or efforts to resolve the development problems of Russell's 3.67-
acres would have been undertaken without the Agreement. (R. 345, 112). 
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Legal consideration need not be found in the exchange of money only. Legal 
consideration may consist of: 
. . . some benefit to the promisor; or of some loss, injury, or inconvenience to 
the promisee; or of some money or other thing of value given, exchanged, or 
paid; or of some promise or undertaking of the promisee to pay, give, or 
exchange such thing of value, or to incur some trouble or expense, or to do or 
not do some lawful act, or to surrender, abandon, or suspend the exercise of 
some legal right. . . . 
77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser §35 (1975). This concept is well recognized in Utah: 
Consideration is an act or promise, bargained for and given in exchange for a 
promise. Promises made by a party pursuant to a bilateral contract to do an act 
or to forbear from doing an act that would be detrimental to the promisor or 
beneficial to the promisee may constitute the consideration for the other's 
promise. 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 
(Utah 1985). The consideration given by Coulter & Smith for the Agreement with Russell was 
its promise to resolve Russell's development difficulties by incorporating the 3.67-Acre Parcel 
into Coulter & Smith's overall development plan. 
The only evidence Russell submitted that no consideration had been given for the 
Agreement was his testimony that (1) no money had exchanged hands (R. 70, f8), and (2) that 
he had received no benefit as a result of Coulter & Smith's efforts (R. 262, f6). While Coulter 
& Smith acknowledges that no money was exchanged, such consideration was unnecessary. 
Coulter & Smith promised to do something beneficial for Russell, i.e., work on resolving 
Russell's development problems. That promise in itself was sufficient consideration for the 
Agreement. Thus, the trial court's conclusion of law that no consideration passed at the outset 
of the Agreement must be reversed. 
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The trial court's factual conclusion that Russell received no benefit as a result of Coulter 
& Smith's efforts is disputed. Russell attested that he received no benefit. Coulter and Smith 
indicated that regardless of the outcome of this lawsuit, Russell would have the use and benefit 
of many of Coulter & Smith's efforts. (R. 345-46, f 13). The trial court should not have 
resolved this factual dispute on summary judgment. This finding should be reversed and the 
matter remanded for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this court should reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this J ^ daY o f December, 1995. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Coulter & Smith, Ltd. 
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APPENDIX I 
Coulter S Smith, Ltd 
April 23, 1991 
Dr. Roger Russell 
10894 So* Whirlaway Lane 
Sandy, UT 84093 
Dear Dr. Russell: 
In response to your request for a written proposal to purchase 
your lots west of 1700 East at 10800 South, I submit the follow-
ing offer which you may accept by signing below: 
Price: $26,500 per lot during the 1st month following completion 
of the lots; price of each lot to increase $100 per lot each 
month thereafter until each lot is closed. 
Upon completion of the subdivision development we offer to pay 
you $1,500 per lot; the balance of the purchase price ($25,000 at 
the outset) to be paid upon closing of each lot. We understand 
that the cost of the land and the lot improvements will be paid 
upon closing of each lot. 
The enclosed Work Exchange Agreement will initiate our coopera-
tive efforts. We will proceed posthaste to annex and develop our 
tracts jointly. I believe that working in concert will greatly 
facilitate zoning and all other development concerns. 
Respectfully, 
Nathan Coulter 
pmp 
Coulter & Smith Ltd. is hereby granted an option to purchase lots 
as per terms detailed above: Th.-j o^ f'orv fer^'Ko^ £/ears c^ :*v f/^ 
date Qf COKtofc-fi'fr*- 0£ ik^zKlxltui'Si'o* . 
y^k- f^«»6/ ¥-??-<?/ 1991 
Dr. RWer R u s s e l l Date 
9894 South 2300 €ast C V U I D I T **A * 
Sandy. Utoh 84092 fcXHIBIT n 
/OAI \ A / I ^ ^rn/t f\ /\ ft £\ t\ <\ 
APPENDIX II 
Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COULTER & SMITH, LTD., a Nevada 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROGER RUSSELL and ROGER 
RICHARDS, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 940905806PR 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
This matter having come on before the Court on Defendant Roger Russell's 
("Russell") Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. The Court having 
heard the argument of counsel at hearing on April 18, 1995, in which Richard A. Rappaport of 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal appeared on behalf of Plaintiff and Michael Zundel and Adam 
Affleck appeared on behalf of Defendant Roger Russell, the Court having reviewed the briefs, 
affidavits, and other materials submitted by the parties, and having otherwise determined to grant 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Page 1 
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Russell's Motion, the Court hereby sets forth the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Complaint of Plaintiff Coulter & Smith, Ltd. ("Coulter & Smith") 
seeks enforcement of a purported option to purchase certain real property. 
2. The purported option refers to a 3.67 acre parcel owned (or controlled) 
by Russell located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. The purported option provides for the sale of "lots" to be developed by 
Coulter & Smith on the Property. 
4. The purported option does not specify how many lots are to be developed 
on the Property so that the ultimate size and number of the lots to be sold (or controlled) is 
uncertain, as is the price to be paid for the entire parcel. 
5. No transfer of lots was contemplated by the parties until after Coulter & 
Smith completed subdivision development of the Property. 
6. The purported option does not provide an outside date by which it must 
be exercised. 
7. The purported option required Coulter & Smith to "post hast" annex and 
develop subdivision lots on the property. 
8. The purported option was granted in April, 1991. 
9. As of January, 1995 Coulter & Smith has failed to annex or develop the 
Property. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Page 2 
10. A reasonable time for exercise of the option has passed. 
11. Coulter & Smith paid no money and furnished no consideration for the 
purported option at the outset of the option. 
12. Coulter & Smith did work to estaonsn a subdivision, but it was not work 
done strictly to enhance the value of the Property. 
13. Coulter & Smith's work to establish a subdivision was not a detriment to 
Coulter & Smith because it enhanced the value of its own property. 
14. Russell withdrew any offer to sell lots when Russell attempted to sell the 
Property to the LDS Church in November, 1992. 
15. The Court makes no factual finding as to Coulter & Smith's alleged post-
signing alteration of the purported option. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Although the legal description of the overall parcel owned by Russell is 
sufficient, the purported option is deficient as to the number of lots and as to the price to be 
paid, and therefore, the purported option is unenforceable. 
2. The purported option does not violate state and local laws against selling 
subdivision lots prior to obtaining governmental approval because no lots were to be sold until 
the property was legally subdivided. 
3. The purported option violates the rule against perpetuities because there 
is no provision as to the date by which it must be exercised. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Page 3 
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4. Plaintiff's argument that the purported option must be exercised within a 
"reasonable time" is rejected because it leaves wide open when a "reasonable time" is. The fact 
that the purported option said plaintiff would proceed "post haste" to annex and develop the 
property and it has not been done by January 1995 is more evidence that there is no cutoff date 
and thus the rule against perpetuities has been violated. 
4. Any offer to sell created by the purported option has been withdrawn. 
5. The purported option is not valid in that it was not supported by 
consideration at the outset. 
6. A reasonable time for purchasing has passed and the purchase has not 
taken place. 
7. Any option created by the purported option has lapsed because a reasonable 
time has passed. 
8. Russell's Motion for Summary Judgment shall be granted and judgment 
entered in Russell's favor. 
DATED this / ^ d a v of^Sl?1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
y^f-y^x^-
onorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
sent by United States mail, postage fiilly prepaid, on this / ^ day of April, 1995, to the 
following: 
Michael Zundel, Esq. 
John N. Brems, Esq. 
Adam S. Affleck, Esq. 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH BROWN & DUNN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FMvAcoulrus.fof 
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Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690) 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COULTER & SMITH, LTD., a Nevada 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROGER RUSSELL, ROGER RICHARDS, 
and KRISTIN RUSSELL, 
Defendants. 
3ACo(oH-3 
AMENDED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, NUNC PRO TUNC 
Civil No. 940905806PR 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
This matter having come on before the Court on January 18, 1995, upon motion 
for summary judgment regularly made by the Defendant, Roger Russell ("Russell"), to dismiss 
the above-captioned action on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that Russell is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; Michael N. Zundel and Adam S. 
Affleck appeared on behalf of Defendants and Richard A. Rappaport appeared on behalf of 
Plaintiff; the Court having considered the briefs, affidavits and other materials submitted by the 
Amended Summary Judgment, Nunc Pro Tunc Page 1 
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parties and having considered the arguments of counsel for the respective parties, and after due 
deliberation having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Clerk 
of the Court having previously erroneously entered Summary Judgment on April 18, 1995, and 
the Court having previously entered Summary Judgment on May 16, 1995, the parties having 
stipulated to amend the judgment nunc pro tunc, and for good cause otherwise appearing, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED that the Summary Judgments entered on April 18, 1995 and May 16, 
1995 be and hereby are VACATED; and it is further hereby 
ORDERED that Kristin Russell be and hereby is made a party defendant to this 
lawsuit, but only for purposes of plaintiffs quiet title action and any appeal thereof; and it is 
further hereby 
ORDERED that Russell's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby 
is, granted; and it is further hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Coulter & Smith, Ltd., has no 
claim to or interest in the real property which is the subject of this action and which is more 
particularly described below. The claims and causes of action described in the complaint filed 
by Coulter & Smith, Ltd. commencing this action are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on 
the merits; and it is further 
ORDERED that there being no just reason for delay, the clerk of the court is 
instructed to immediately enter this judgment as a final judgment of the court. 
Located in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
Amended Summary Judgment, Nunc Pro Tunc Page 2 
Beginning at a point which is East 1760 feet and South 47°06' 
East 271.4 feet and South 1536 feet from the Northwest corner of 
the Southwest quarter, of Section 16, Township 3 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 414.5 
feet; thence North 130 feet; thence East 66 feet; thence North 47 
feet; thence East 179.5 feet; thence North 50 feet; thence West 
153 feet; thence North 103 feet; thence West 507 feet; thence 
South 330 feet to the point of beginning. 
and it is further 
ORDERED that this Summary Judgment be entered as of May 16,1995, nunc pro 
tunc. 
DATED this / day of June, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
/Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
/ District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: ^ 
F\cbg\couIrus.jud 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COULTER & SMITH, LTD., a 
Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROGER RUSSELL and ROGER 
RICHARDS, 
Defendants. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
PROCEEDINGS: COURT'S 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
1-18-95 
Civil No. 940905806PR 
Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 24th day of 
January, 1995, the above-entitled matter came on for 
Hearing in chambers area of Courtroom No. 502 of the 
Court's Building, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, before the Honorable Homer 
F. Wilkinson, Judge in the Third Judicial District, State 
of Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
Richard A. Rappaport. Attorney-at-Law, 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C., 525 East First South, Fifth 
Floor, P.O. Box 11008, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008, 
telephone 532-2666, appearing telephonically and on behalf 
of the plaintiff. 
Messrs. Michael N. Zundel, Attorney-at-Law; 
and Adam s. Affleck. Attorney-at-Law, Jardine, Linebaugh, 
1 
1 Brown & Dunn, 370 East South Temple, Suite 400, Salt Lake 
2 City, Utah 84111, telephone 532-7700, appearing 
3 || telephonically and on behalf of the defendants. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 (Whereupon, the following proceedings were 
2 had of record:) 
3 THE COURT: Do I have Mike Zundel and Rick 
4 Rappaport? 
5 MR. RAPPAPORT: Yes, Good afternoon, Judge. 
6 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 
7 MR. ZUNDEL: Yes, your Honor. I have with 
8 me Adam Affleck, but I have you on a speakerphone, if 
9 that's all right. 
10 THE COURT: That's fine, and you're on a 
11 speakerphone here, and I do have a reporter present. I 
12 want to give you my decision in this Coulter & Smith versus 
13 Roger Russell case. I've reviewed your memoranda, and the 
14 case again, and the Court is going to look at the reply 
15 memorandum of the defendants as to the issues that I'm 
16 going to rule on as far as preparing your Findings of Fact 
17 and Conclusions of Law. 
18 The first one that—let's see, is that the 
19 defendant claims the purported option lacks a property 
20 description sufficient to support an enforceable contract 
21 or meet the statute of frauds and is void. The Court would 
22 find that the property description, where it refers to it 
23 as "the lot" or property owned by Russell, that that was 
24 sufficient, but it's lacking where it says that it will be 
25 sold "by lots." 
1 It provides that there is to be paid "so 
2 much for each lot," but that does not provide for how many 
3 lots, and therefore it's deficient as to the description as 
4 to the number of lots and as to the price that is going to 
5 be paid and leaves it open and would be unenforceable. 
6 The second area they're complaining about is 
7 that Utah and local law provide that no interests in 
8 subdivision lots may be sold prior to governmental approval 
9 making the purported option illegal and void. Well, the 
10 Court would find that that is true as far as the local law 
11 is concerned, but would deny their request on this point: 
12 That the lots, if they were established, and then they were 
13 going to be sold according to lots, the Court would find 
14 it's not in violation of that particular provision. 
15 No. 3 is the purported option violates the 
16 rule against perpetuities. The Court would find that the 
17 option agreement does violate the rule of perpetuities— 
18 against perpetuities in that there is no provision to set 
19 this particular option as to date it must be exercised, 
20 that if it was argued at the trial by counsel that there 
21 would be a reasonable time, that that is a question of what 
22 is "reasonable" then, but it leaves it wide open as to when 
23 it could happen. 
24 And in fact the option was granted I 
25 believe, as I recall my notes, in April of 1991, and it 
1 provided that it would proceed "post haste11 to annex and 
2 develop the tract, and it is now January of 1995, and it 
3 has not been done, which is more proof or evidence that 
4 there is no cutoff date and it violates the rule against 
5 perpetuities. 
6 The Court would further find that the 
7 question of what is a reasonable time in most situations is 
8 normally a question of fact. The Court would find in this 
9 situation here, in view of the provision in the option that 
JO it would proceed "post haste," that a "reasonable time" has 
11 passed and that it has not been done. 
12 The next one, No. 4 is that any offer to 
13 sell created by the purported option has been withdrawn. 
14 And that raises a question whether the option was valid and 
15 whether it was just an offering and it had been withdrawn. 
16 And the Court would find that the option is 
17 not a valid option, it was not supported by consideration 
18 at the outset. 
19 Counsel argues that the consideration 
20 furnished at a later date, the alleged consideration 
21 furnished at a later date was sufficient, but the Court 
22 would find even in the affidavit of Mr. Coulter and the 
23 memorandum of counsel it's indicated that nothing had been 
24 done to improve this property, that work had been done to 
25 establish a subdivision, but it had not been work which was 
1 strictly to enhance the value of this property. 
2 It was not a detriment to Mr. Coulter in any 
3 way, but it enhanced his property as far as the subdivision 
4 was concerned, and the Court, as I say, would find that 
5 there was no consideration again for the option, but the 
6 option was not a valid option. 
7 That any offer that was made was withdrawn 
8 in November of 1992 when the attempt was made to sell the 
9 property to the LDS Church. 
10 No. 5, Coulter & Smith's post-signing 
11 alteration rejected the purported option and renders it 
12 unenforceable. The Court would deny it on those grounds. 
13 That's a question of fact as to who put that in there. 
14 It's disputed, and the Court would deny their summary 
15 judgment on that basis. 
16 No. 6, any option created by the purported 
17 option has lapsed, I think that a reasonable time has 
18 passed, as I've already indicated. If there was an option, 
19 a reasonable time has passed, and that it has not been 
20 done. 
21 Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court 
22 would grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment; 
23 however, in the form of a summary judgment, not in the form 
24 of a motion to dismiss, and that the defendant shall 
25 prepare the necessary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
1 Law based on my decision• Any questions? 
2 MR. ZUNDEL: Will the Court expunge the lis 
3 pendens? 
4 MR. RAPPAPORT: Your Honor, we're going to 
5 probably appeal this, and I don't think that the Court made 
6 its ruling—I don't think that the Court should be ruling 
7 on the issue of the lis pendens. The lis pendens is a 
8 notice that a case has been filed, and we're going to be 
9 appealing this ruling. 
10 MR. ZUNDEL: It's a lien, and if they want 
11 to stay this Court's order expunging the lis pendens, they 
12 know how to do it; post a bond. 
13 MR. RAPPAPORT: The lis pendens is something 
14 we're allowed to file to say that a case is pending, and if 
15 the Court is ruling on the summary judgment, that's one 
16 thing. I don't think it was asked to expunge the lis 
17 pendens. We surely didn't brief as to whether the Court 
18 has a right to expunge the lis pendens while an appeal .is 
19 pending. 
20 THE COURT: Let me state this, that in view 
21 of my ruling, no, a motion has not been made to release the 
22 lis pendens, but if a motion were to be made, then I would 
23 grant that motion striking the lis pendens, in view of the 
24 ruling. I would have no alternative but to do that. 
25 [I What counsel, Mr. Rappaport, you do as far 
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1 as your appeal and motion for stay, that would be something 
2 you would have to do, and I would have to make that 
3 determination. So I guess what I'm saying right now is 
4 that I'm granting the motion for summary judgment. What 
5 the two of you do as far as the lis pendens and the motion 
6 for stay, that would be up to you. 
7 MR. ZUNDEL: Thank you, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Anything else? 
9 MR. RAPPAPORT: No, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
11 MR. RAPPAPORT: Thank you, your Honor, 
12 (Whereupon, at the hour of 1:55 p.m., the 
1 3 I) proceedings came to a close.) 
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2 REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 
3 I, Edward P. Midgley, RPR, CM, official 
4 court reporter in The Third Judicial District, State of 
5 Utah, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
6 proceedings were by me stenographically reported at the 
7 times and places herein set forth; that said report was, by 
8 me, subsequently caused to be reduced to typewritten form, 
9 consisting of pages 1 through 8, both inclusive; and that 
10 said report, so transcribed, constitutes a true and correct 
11 transcription of testimony given, evidence adduced, and 
12 proceedings had in the above-entitled cause. 
13 To which certification I hereby set my hand 
14 II this 6th day of January, 1995 at Salt^  Lake\city, Utah. 
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